Using U.K. microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary annuity market demand. We …nd that annuity market participation increases with …nancial wealth, life expectancy and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses. We then show that these empirically-motivated determinants of annuity market participation have the same, quantitatively important, e¤ects in a life-cycle model of annuity demand, saving and portfolio choice. Moreover, reasonable preference parameters predict annuity demand levels comparable to the data, thereby questioning the conventional wisdom that limited annuity market participation is a puzzle to be explained.
Introduction
Why are annuities not voluntarily taken up by a larger number of retirees? In the individual consumption/savings-portfolio choice literature, a very important participation puzzle arises from the revealed preference of households not to voluntarily buy annuities at retirement, despite the strong theoretical reasons that point towards high demand for these products.
Speci…cally, as early as 1965, Yaari demonstrates that risk aversion is su¢ cient to induce a household to buy an actuarially fair annuity as protection against life expectancy risk. Yet, despite this strong theoretical result, annuity demand remains very low in the data, 1 what is known as the "annuity market participation puzzle".
It is important to understand why this puzzle arises from a theoretical perspective 2 but there is also another, equally strong, empirical reason to explain the puzzle. Speci…cally, there has been a large shift in pension provision from de…ned bene…t (DB) to de…ned contribution (DC) plans both in the U.S. and in the U.K.. DB plans o¤er not only a …xed monthly payment but also o¤er it for life, therefore providing a natural insurance for life expectancy risk. On the other hand, DC plans place the decision of how fast to decumulate during retirement in the hands of the individual. 3 As a result, the issue of annuity provision could become very important for …nancial planning after retirement.
Understanding this puzzle has generated a large number of recent papers that have attempted an explanation. Potential explanations involve the lack of actuarially fair annu-1 More recently, Davido¤, Brown and Diamond (2005) show that complete annuitization is optimal in a more general setting than Yaari (1965) when markets are complete. 2 Davido¤ et. al. (2005) imply that an explanation from the psychology and economics literature might be needed. 3 In the U.K. there is mandatory annuitization at age 75 of three quarters of the accumulated assets in a DC plan.
by investigating empirically the determinants of household annuity market participation in the U.K. voluntary annuity market.
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Our empirical work provides an in depth analysis of what determines voluntary annuity market participation, and what a¤ects the level of annuity demand conditional on participation. We …rst con…rm that there appears to be a substantial voluntary annuity market participation puzzle, since less than 6% of households participate in this market.
For our multivariate empirical analysis, we separate the sample between stockholders and non-stockholders. We take this route because wealthier and more educated households can better a¤ord and understand annuities, and because we know that stock market participation increases with wealth and education (for instance, Campbell (2006) ). Indeed, the annuity market participation rate for stockholders (9:6%) is three times the participation rate of non-stockholders (3:2%). In all regressions, we …nd that the annuitization behavior of stockholders is better explained by a reduced form model, even though the factors determining participation are broadly the same for both groups. Speci…cally, annuity market participation increases with life expectancy, education and …nancial wealth. Pension income (or compulsory annuity income) crowds out annuity demand conditional on voluntary annuity market participation, while a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses is a hurdle for voluntary annuitization. We view these empirical …ndings as interesting in their own right since they increase our understanding of the factors determining annuity market participation.
We next construct a quantitative model that may replicate these empirical …ndings, and that can therefore be used to quantify the strength of the annuity market participation puzzle. Speci…cally, we build a model of life-cycle saving, portfolio choice and annuity market 14 We focus on U.K. data (the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA, see Marmot et al., 2006) ) due to the the large array of annuity market products available to the consumer in this market. Brown (2001) has a similar research objective based on the U.S. equivalent of the U.K. data we use, but undertakes a di¤erent research strategy. Speci…cally, Brown (2001) focuses on …rst calculating the value of having access to an annuity market for each household (based on a life-cycle simulated model) and then relates this value to observable characteristics. Instead, we try to …nd the parameters of a simulated model that may explain observed annuity demand and be consistent with the empirical characteristics of actual annuity market participants.
participation with Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences over a non-durable good and investigate whether reasonable preference parameters can replicate the observed annuity market participation rate, and the level of annuity demand. To do so, we use the wealth distribution and median pension level in the data as exogenous inputs to generate predicted annuity demand at retirement. We …nd that preference parameters like risk aversion, the strength of the bequest motive, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the decision to access the stock market are key determinants of the model's quantitative predictions. Financial wealth is a key endogenous state variable in the model, is directly a¤ected by these parameters and is therefore a key predictor variable in assessing the model's quantitative implications. Contrary to frictionless theoretical models, we …nd that many households should not purchase an annuity partly because of the state pension income, partly because of the empirical wealth distribution (many households cannot a¤ord an annuity), partly because of the bequest motive, and partly because of better opportunities and ‡exibility in saving through the stock market.
We next use a method of simulated moments to estimate two preference parameters to match two moments in the data: the annuity market participation rate, and, conditional on participation, the amount of annuities purchased. We estimate the bequest parameter and the intertemporal rate of substitution, …xing the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to two.
We choose to perform this analysis separately for stockholders and non-stockholders both on account of our multivariate probit …ndings and due to the large impact stock market investment opportunities have on the annuity decision in the theoretical model. 15 We …nd that the life-cycle model is consistent with the empirical …ndings for reasonable preference speci…cations. For both stockholders and non-stockholders, we need a bequest motive, and an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of around 0:5 for stockholders and 0:1 for non- 15 We do not model the endogenous decision of whether to participate or not in the stock market. Gomes and Michaelides (2005) argue in a life-cycle model that households with low …nancial wealth can be kept out of the stock market with a small …xed cost. Given that in our data the households that do not participate in the stock market are much poorer in terms of …nancial wealth than stock market participants, we think that a small …xed cost will keep these households out of the stock market as well. We do not model this endogenous choice explicitly here to keep the model relatively simple.
stockholders. We view these parameter estimates as reasonable estimates for preferences, being consistent with the empirical evidence in, for instance, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , Cagetti (2003 ) and, in particular, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002 . Overall, comparing the predictions of the model with their empirical counterparts we …nd that reasonable calibrations can generate the low annuity demand observed in the data and that, therefore, the annuity market participation puzzle might not be as deep as previously thought. A caveat must, nevertheless, be mentioned. Our theoretical model generates a strong demand for variable (stock-market linked) annuities, that we do not allow to exist. We make this choice (a form of market incompleteness) because, even though variable annuities exist in the U.K., they are rarely demanded. Speci…cally, more than 70 percent of purchased annuities in the U.K.
are of the nominal (…xed payout) type (Stark, 2002) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the multivariate probit (reduced form) results on the actual determinants of annuity market demand (de…ned as annuity market participation and the level of annuity demand conditional on participation). In Section 3 we perform a number of comparative statics exercises from a calibrated life-cycle model to understand what a quantitative model predicts about the annuity market. In Section 4 we estimate the structural parameters of this model and investigate the strength of the annuity market participation puzzle by comparing the moments in the data to the ones from the model. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Analysis

Dataset
The empirical part of the paper is based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA, see Marmot et al., 2006 what is generally referred to as the annuity market participation puzzle. Moreover, the puzzle seems to exist even in the U.K. which is generally accepted to have the most mature annuity market in the world (see Poterba, 2002, 2004) .
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Table 1 also indicates that there might be an interesting correlation between the decision to participate in the stock market and the decision to purchase an annuity. Stock market participation 20 is around 42.5% of the total sample but the percentage of stock market participants purchasing an annuity (9.6%) is three times the percentage of stock market nonparticipants (3.2%). The di¤erence is statistically highly signi…cant with a t-test statistic of 9:1. Equivalently, Table 1 shows that more than two thirds (213 out of 309) of all annuity market participants also participate in the stock market. Thus, there seems to be some connection between the decision to participate in the two markets and we will investigate this further in both the empirical and theoretical analysis that follows.
19 Banks and Emmerson (1999) use the family resources survey and report similar statistics for voluntary annuity market participation. 20 We de…ne a stock market participant as a household that has stocks in an individual savings account (ISA), or a personal equity plan (PEP), or indirect stock holdings in an investment trust, or direct holdings of stocks. Indirect stock holdings in occupational or private pension schemes are not accounted for. 
Wealth and Income
To be informative about annuity take-up decisions, …nancial wealth should be measured before annuitization takes place. For annuities already observed in the …rst wave we capitalize the value of the annuity by multiplying the annual annuity income with the annuity factor and add this to the household's …nancial wealth to get total …nancial wealth. 21 Moreover, observations without annuity income in the …rst wave, but with reported annuity income in the second wave, must have purchased their annuity in the time between the two surveys.
By combining the second wave annuity information for these observations with the …rst wave household variables, we achieve the desired match between the annuity and the household characteristics immediately before voluntary annuitization occurs. We use an annuity factor of 13. The annuity factor was calculated using the Financial Services Authority comparative tables. These tables show the monthly payments o¤ered by the main annuity providers under the open market option. The monthly payments correspond to a purchase price of 100,000 GBP of a single life annuity, with no guarantee, for a 65-year old male. We use the average monthly payment across providers to calculate the corresponding annuity factor. 22 Banks et al. (2007) provide evidence that British households do not reduce housing consumption with increasing age because they stay in their original residence. Correspondingly, we do not use housing wealth in our multivariate analysis because we view the relatively higher liquidity in …nancial wealth (with respect (65; 000) GBP, versus 50; 000 (14; 200) for non-annuitants, already suggesting the importance of …nancial wealth in purchasing a voluntary annuity. More detailed evidence is displayed in Figure 1 . The …gure shows average voluntary annuity market participation across the 2:5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97:5% percentiles of the wealth distribution. While average participation is less than 1% among the 262 households in the bottom 5% of the wealth distribution, it increases steeply to almost 20% among the 262 households in the top 5% of the wealth distribution. Given that the 10% and 25% quantiles of the wealth distribution are 700 GBP and 3; 300 GBP, respectively, it appears that households in the lower third of the wealth distribution are generally constrained by insu¢ cient …nancial wealth to participate in the voluntary annuity market.
Figure 1 also decomposes the sample across wealth quantiles into stock market nonparticipants and participants. While stock market participants are still slightly outnumbered around the median wealth by non-participants, almost all households around the 75%, 90%
and 97.5% percentiles of the wealth distribution are stock market participants. The mean (median) wealth of investors who participate in both markets is 174,000 (100,000) GBP (Table 2) , considerably larger than the mean (median) wealth of annuity market participants.
The existence of other pension income o¤ers another potential explanation for low annuity market participation. The institutional details of the U.K. pension system have been described elsewhere (for example, Blundell et al. (2002) and Blake (2003)) and we only summarize its main features. The …rst tier of the public pension system is the ‡at Basic State Pension (BSP). The second tier is earnings-related and can either be provided by the government or the private sector. Both occupational and personal private sector pensions in the U.K. are subject to compulsory annuitization laws (an annuity must be purchased within a certain time from retirement). These compulsory annuities must be distinguished from the voluntary annuities purchased from non-pension wealth that we focus on. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) indicate that the compulsory annuity market in the U.K. is much larger than the voluntary annuity market: in 1998 the former had a size of 5.4 billion GBP versus 0.8 billion GBP for the latter.
to housing) as a more relevant criterion for the household decision to annuitize or not.
Public pensions and the compulsory annuities from private pensions may be close substitutes for the voluntary annuity market. Indeed, Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) …nd that the earnings-related tier of the U.K. public pension system serves as a perfect substitute for private savings. Table 2 wealth percentiles. Nevertheless, we cannot interpret these results as evidence against the hypothesis that other pension income crowds out voluntary annuities, since other variables (like …nancial wealth) need to be controlled for.
Health and Life Expectancy
Apart from wealth and existing pensions, an individual's health condition and her life expectancy should also a¤ect the decision to annuitize since annuities hedge longevity risk.
These products are in fact priced to re ‡ect the average life expectancy of annuity market participants. If an individual has private information suggesting that she is unlikely to reach the age of an average annuity market participant, she will not buy an annuity simply because the product is overpriced for her. Poterba (2002, 2004) indeed …nd evidence for adverse selection in the U.K.'s annuity market: participants in the voluntary annuity market tend to live longer than non-participants. More generally, Rosen and Wu (2004) …nd evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey that health status a¤ects portfolio choice and stock market participation. Since annuities are a form of …nancial product that is even more explicitly linked to health status, we expect that health can be a strong predictor of participation in the annuity market.
ELSA also allows us to use subjective survival probabilities as a determinant of the annuitization decision. The questionnaire asks individuals of age less than, or equal to, 65 (69, 74, 79, 84 and 89) "What are the chances that you will live to be 75 (80, 85, 90, 95 and 100, respectively) or more?"and gives a range from 0-100 for possible answers. We compare these subjective survival probabilities with gender and age-speci…c objective survival probabilities from the Government Actuary's Department tables (GAD, 2006) . Table 3 shows that average values for subjective and objective GAD probabilities are very close. This con…rms prior evidence by McGarry (1995, 2002) for the U.S. that subjective probabilities tend to aggregate well to population probabilities. However, we …nd that younger survey participants in ELSA underestimate population probabilities, 23 while older survey participants tend to overestimate these probabilities.
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We see from Table 3 that annuity market participants report a survival probability higher than non-participants by …ve percentage points. The di¤erence in objective GAD survival probabilities is three percentage points and thus slightly smaller. These results are in line with the Poterba (2002, 2004) self-selection …ndings for the voluntary annuity market in the U.K.. Table 3 also shows that annuity market participants slightly overestimate survival probabilities relative to the GAD probabilities by one percentage point, while nonparticipants tend to to underestimate survival probabilities by one percentage point which con…rms the adverse selection hypothesis.
Socio-Economic Background
The …nal group of variables possibly a¤ecting annuity market participation decisions is household composition and education. Education might matter since annuity products require a basic level of …nancial literacy. 25 We di¤erentiate between three education levels: low, medium and high. Table 3 shows that annuity market participants are on average much better educated than non-participants. While 61% of the non-participants are in the lowest education group, only one-third of all annuity holders are in the low education category.
For the high education level, the order changes: only 9% (25%) of non-participants (participants) have a higher education degree. We also investigate household composition to detect a possible bequest motive, which might be a barrier for voluntary irreversible annuitization.
The unconditional statistics in Table 3 do not indicate that marital status or the number of children vary between participants and non-participants.
Econometric Analysis
We investigate the household's decision to participate in the voluntary annuity market and the amount of purchased annuities conditional on participation in a multivariate regression setup. impact of an explanatory variable, we also compute marginal e¤ects to assess the quantitative impact. We do this for a baseline observation that is de…ned as a 65 year-old, single, male, without children, medium education, an average reported survival probability, average pension income and …nancial wealth.
Annuity Market Participation
Con…rming the earlier descriptive statistics in Table 2 , …nancial wealth is shown to be one of the most important predictors of annuity market participation, 27 for both non-stockholders and stockholders. A 1% increase in …nancial wealth signi…cantly increases the annuity market participation probabilities of non-stockholders (stockholders) by 2.3 (3.6) percentage points. On the other hand, pension income turns out to be statistically insigni…cant for both stockholders and non-stockholders.
Turning to health and life expectancy, we …nd that the health indicators are insigni…cant once we control for the subjective survival probabilities. Correspondingly, we only include the survival probabilities in the regression, since these are a direct measure of the longevity risk targeted by annuities. This variable a¤ects di¤erently the annuitization decision of nonstockholders and stockholders. While statistically and economically insigni…cant for nonstockholders, the variable turns out to be the quantitatively most important predictor of the annuitization decision for stockholders. A one percentage point increase in the survival probability signi…cantly increases the annuity participation probability by 4:7 percentage points as can be seen from Table 4 .
Married …nancial units are signi…cantly less likely to purchase an annuity. The marginal e¤ects suggest that changing the marital status of the baseline household from single to married would signi…cantly decrease the probability to participate in the voluntary annuity market by almost four percentage points. This turns out to be the quantitatively most important impact on the annuitization decision for non-stockholders. On the contrary, the number of children (or the presence of children or grandchildren in alternative unreported speci…cations) does not have a signi…cant e¤ect. This could mean that any bequest motive focuses on the spouse and not on the children. Alternatively, the large impact of marital status could be interpreted as intra-household hedging of longevity risk, instead of relying 27 For all …nancial variables, we tested for possible nonlinearities by including a squared term. This term always turned out insigni…cant.
on the annuity market. However, the explanatory …nancial wealth and pension income variables are measured on the household level and already comprise the wealth and income of the spouse. Therefore, the bequest motive appears to be the more suitable explanation of the importance of the marital status variable.
We include dummies for low and high education levels as a measure of …nancial literacy.
The low education dummy shows up signi…cantly negative for both non-stockholders and stockholders. The high education dummy has the expected positive sign but turns out to be insigni…cant. Changing the education level of the baseline household from medium to low decreases the participation probability by roughly 2.6 percentage points. This is a quantitatively large e¤ect and underscores the importance of …nancial literacy.
Conditional Annuity Demand
We estimate a linear regression model for annuity demand measured in terms of log annual annuity income on the sub-samples of annuity market participants. Results are again given in Table 4 
Summary
We provide an in depth empirical analysis of the voluntary annuity market participation decision and the annuity demand conditional on participation. We recon…rm that there appears to be a substantial voluntary annuity market participation puzzle since less than 6% of households participate in this market. Moreover, annuity market participation increases with …nancial wealth, life expectancy and education. Pension income (or compulsory annuity income) crowds out annuity demand conditional on voluntary annuity market participation, while a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses is a hurdle for voluntary annuitization.
Understanding the Implications of a Life-cycle Model
In the next two sections we investigate the implications of a life-cycle model of annuity demand and portfolio choice and assess the model's consistency with the empirical …ndings in the previous section.
The Model
Available Annuity Contracts
We study nominal annuity contracts but for simplicity we assume zero in ‡ation. 28 One main component of the analysis involves calculating the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of the annuity, since the insurance company uses this value to calculate the price of the product. The EPDV will depend on the annual annuity payment, the survival probabilities and the term structure of interest rates at the time of retirement. For instance, if at retirement age the annualized interest rate on a bond with maturity t is r t;1 , p t denotes the probability that the household is alive at date t, conditional on being alive at date t 1 ( p 1 1) and the household purchases an annuity that makes an annual payment of A, the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of the annuity payouts is given by:
We use this EPDV to determine the cost of buying an annuity at retirement by multiplying the EPDV with one plus a load factor (P ) which is greater than or equal to zero, obtaining a measure of the "money's worth" of the annuity. If the load factor is zero, then 28 Recall that our data does not allow us to distinguish between nominal, real and variable annuities. While all of these annuity products are available in the U.K., Stark (2002) shows that more than 70 percent of all purchased annuities are of the nominal type.
the annuity contract is actuarially fair and the "money's worth"equals one. 29 Empirical evidence by Mitchell et. al. (1999) illustrates that the load factor varies between 8% and 20% depending on di¤erent assumptions about discounting and mortality tables; a 20% value is suggested as indicative of the transaction cost involved and this is the baseline value we use in our calibration.
Retirement Income
At retirement the household has …nancial wealth X 1 , which can be used to purchase an annuity. In addition, the household is endowed with pension income in each period, L, calibrated to be consistent with the available empirical evidence. Letting r t+1;1 denote the one period interest rate, e r t+1 the random return on the stock market and t the share of wealth in stocks, the evolution of cash-on-hand can be written as:
We assume no borrowing in retirement and no short sales of stocks so that t lies between zero and one.
Preferences
We model household saving, portfolio and annuity choices from retirement onwards at an annual frequency. The household lives for a maximum of T (35) periods after retirement. We allow for uncertainty in the age of death with p t denoting the probability that the household is alive at date t, conditional on being alive at date t 1 ( p 1 1). Household preferences are then described by the Epstein-Zin (1989) utility function:
29 The annuity premium/load factor (P ) and the money's worth are therefore de…ned as:
and M oney 0 s W orth = EP DV AnnuityCost :
where is the time discount factor, b is the strength of the bequest motive, is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The state variables in each period are current cash on hand, the annuity payment which will optimally be chosen at retirement, and age. In each period t, t = 1; :::; T , the household chooses optimal consumption C t and the share of saving to invest in the stock market subject to a budget constraint. In the …rst period of retirement, the household also chooses the level of annuity to be purchased.
Wealth Distribution and Pension Income
To eventually compare the predictions of the model with the observed annuity demand and participation rates, we need (among other exogenous inputs) an initial wealth distribution and a reasonable pension level, and we take both of these from the data. At the same time, based on our empirical results, we also condition on stock market participation status and solve two di¤erent models, one in which stock market participation is allowed and another where access to the stock market does not exist, therefore requiring di¤erent inputs for wealth and pension income depending on the stock market participation status. Using these exogenous inputs we then compute the average annuity participation rate, average portfolio demand and the aggregate demand for annuities.
To match the de…nition of wealth in our model to the one in the data we add household pension income and …nancial wealth (wealth in …nancial assets, excluding retirement and housing wealth) for individuals aged between 55 and 70. Pension income is the median pension income received by retired individuals and for simplicity we set it to a constant that di¤ers depending on stock market participation status.
30 30 There is a positive relationship between pension income and …nancial wealth in the data but a ‡at pension here makes the model simpler to solve and serves a conservative approach. Speci…cally, since increasing private pensions crowds out annuity demand (both in the data and in the model) we create an upward bias in average annuity demand generated by the model when we use a ‡at pension.
Mortality Probabilities
Period one is taken to be age 65 and conditional survival probabilities for the typical household are taken from the U.K. GAD for 2002-2004.
Solution Technique and Other Parameters
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the …nite nature of the problem a solution exists and can be obtained by backward induction, while we assume decisions are taken at an annual frequency. We assume a constant interest rate equal to 2%. The mean equity premium is set at 4% with a standard deviation of 18%. In the baseline case we use a CRRA preference speci…cation with a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 3 ( = 1=3) and a discount factor equal to 0:98.
Results
Annuity Policy Functions
We now report a series of comparative statics results to understand household choices according to this model. Figure 3 plots the annuity demand choice as a function of wealth at the time of retirement for households that have access to the stock market (stockholders) and households that make annuity choices without access to the stock market (non-stockholders).
For both cases, the demand for annuities is zero for low wealth levels re ‡ecting mainly the annuity in the form of pension income received during retirement. Higher wealth levels generate a monotonically increasing demand for annuities. From the shape of the policy function it should be immediately noted that the wealth distribution is a necessary input before pronouncing the presence of an annuity market participation puzzle. In an economy where all households are very poor, the model predicts that no annuity demand will be generated and therefore the lack of annuity market participation is not a puzzle but rather a prediction of the model. Access to the stock market makes the wealth level that warrants entry to the annuity market surprisingly higher. This is consistent with the idea that households might value the ‡exibility that can be o¤ered by investing in a higher mean return asset more than the security of an annuity payout. 31 We …nd this result quite surprising given the relatively low equity premium (4%) and the fact that we ignore any stock market predictability that can make the risk/return trade-o¤ from stock market investments even more advantageous.
We also note that this result is consistent with the idea that stock market participation might be related to annuity market participation (an idea that received empirical support in the previous section). Nevertheless, the comparative statics result here could lead us to conclude that access to the stock market decreases the demand for annuities, contrary to what we observe in the data. This conclusion is incorrect, however, since simulations must also be done to compute the total annuity demand given that stockholders are richer and are therefore more likely than non-stockholders to be very much to the right tail of the wealth distribution and therefore generate a higher average demand for annuities. We investigate this issue later on.
Simulated Consumption and Wealth Pro…les
Given that we have computed policy functions for annuity demands as a function of …nancial wealth and given the initial observed wealth distribution in the data, we can simulate the evolution of individual consumption, portfolio choice, annuity demand and wealth for the remainder of a household's lifetime. Figure 4 graphs the consumption pro…le during retirement for a median-wealth nonstockholder for two cases (pro…les for stockholders are qualitatively the same). The …rst is the baseline case. Optimal consumption is decreasing during retirement given the assumptions about the survival probabilities, the discount factor and the rates of return and consumption remains constant at the pension plus the annuity payout after a few periods. The wealth pro…les (omitted for brevity) re ‡ect these consumption choices. Wealth drops at retirement to purchase the annuity and is gradually decumulated to zero when consumption becomes equal to the pension plus the annuity payout. In the same …gure we also report results 31 Variable annuities, which are linked to a broad stock market index, allow the investor to combine protection against longevity risk with stock market exposure. Koijen et al. (2006) show that access to variable annuities during retirement is welfare enhancing.
assuming a 0% load factor (actuarially fair annuity pricing). Consumption is higher during retirement in this case. This re ‡ects the higher level of annuities purchased at retirement at a lower price. Correspondingly, …nancial wealth drops by more at retirement.
Portfolio Choice Policy Functions
The share of wealth invested in the stock market as a function of cash on hand and age is familiar from the literature on life-cycle portfolio choice. 32 Speci…cally, pension income is treated like an implicit bond since it is certain and therefore the share of wealth in stocks is a decreasing function of cash on hand since for diversi…cation purposes the investor allocates all …nancial saving to the stock market. For higher levels of …nancial wealth to pension income, the portfolio becomes more diversi…ed with more riskless assets added to the portfolio but given that there is no background risk (like uncertainty about medical expenditures) in the model, the portfolio remains heavily invested in the stock market.
Participation, Annuity Demand and Annuity Value
Given that we have computed policy functions for annuity demands as a function of …nancial wealth at retirement age and given the observed wealth distribution in the data, we can combine this information to calculate the total level of annuity demand implied by the model, as well as the percentage of households that will participate in the annuity market. We also calculate and report the annuity equivalent wealth (AEW ) that will make an individual without access to the annuity market indi¤erent between purchasing the optimal annuity for the given preference con…guration and economic environment or staying outside the market.
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The maximum welfare when annuities are set to zero is calculated by solving the consumer's problem by setting annuities equal to zero, giving a value function equal to V , while the optimal decision with a potentially positive annuity is given by the value function V . We then solve for the percentage change in liquid wealth that will equate the two value functions 32 For instance, see Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) , Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Polkovnichenko (2007) . 33 This calculation follows Brown (2001) .
for a given level of wealth as
The AEW is therefore given by X= (X + X); a number like 99% means that the household is willing to give up 1% of its wealth to be able to purchase an annuity, that is, annuities are welfare improving to individuals. Following the distinction we view as empirically relevant, we also condition on the stock market participation status when presenting these results. Table 5 ; Panel A, reports various annuity demand statistics for non-stockholders for di¤erent perturbations of the preference parameters (risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the bequest motive).
34 Annuity market participation (column 4)
reports the percentage of households that participate in the annuity market, while voluntary annuity demand (column 5) reports the average annual annuity income in thousands of pounds conditional on participation. Column 6 reports the share of wealth being annuitized at retirement. The last column reports average annuity equivalent wealth. Consistent with the policy function results, higher risk aversion increases annuity market participation, the total level of annuity demand 35 and the share of wealth being annuitized at retirement. A stronger bequest motive, on the other hand, decreases all three measures of annuity demand, while the EIS generally increases annuity demand but the e¤ect is non-monotonic when the bequest motive is operating. As annuity demand increases, the value of annuities is re ‡ected in a lower AEW . In the absence of a bequest motive, this can rise to 11% of wealth (for = 5 and = 0:8) illustrating the value of annuities for more risk averse households with a high EIS.
Quantitatively, the results illustrate that in the absence of a bequest motive, annuity market participation is quite high but there do exist con…gurations of parameters where the model still predicts low participation. When = 2 and = 0:2, for instance, only 6:15% 34 We use a range of preference parameters that is deemed reasonable in the literature either through calibration or through estimation results (see, for example, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and VissingJorgensen (2002)). 35 The reported average level of voluntary annuity demand falls but the total annuity demand rises since there are more participants now. We report this statistic because this will be more directly comparable to the empirical section which reports per capita annuity income conditional on participation.
of households choose to participate in the annuity market and they annuitize around one third of their wealth. This result seems very surprising given the existing literature on the annuity market participation puzzle. What explains this …nding? This preference parameter con…guration implies a weak motive to save, while the pension system already provides a substitute for the provision of longevity insurance. As a result, very few households choose to participate in the annuity market. This explanation is consistent with the other …nding from the table that as risk aversion increases, the insurance value of annuities rises substantially and annuity market participation can rise up to 67% (for = 5 and = 0:5 or = 0:8).
The table also illustrates that lower annuity demand can also be generated for higher risk aversion if one is willing to admit some preference for leaving bequests. Speci…cally, for f = 3, = 0:3g and b = 1 annuity market participation is around 10% and around one third of wealth is annuitized at retirement (38%). For this preference con…guration, the average household is expected to leave around 22; 000 GBP as bequests, if it lives until the end of its possible life.
Similar results arise for the stockholders' case (Panel B). Annuity demand and participation are both increasing in risk aversion and decreasing in the strength of the bequest motive, while the e¤ect of EIS is ambiguous/non-monotonic and depends on the presence of a bequest motive. Even though the policy functions showed that stock market participation implies that a much higher wealth is needed to participate in the annuity market, the annuity participation column gives similar results to the ones we obtain for non-stockholders. This is readily explained by the wealth distribution that is exogenously fed in the model to generate these numbers: stockholders come from a richer part of the population and therefore the …nal reported participation rates tend to be relatively similar across the two experiments, even though for stockholders a much higher wealth threshold is needed before participating in the annuity market. As before, the AEW decreases with higher annuity demand and can fall to 95% of wealth for = 5 and = 0:8; in the absence of a bequest motive.
Summary
We use a life-cycle model to understand both qualitatively and quantitatively the importance of preference parameters in a¤ecting the demand for annuities. Risk aversion, the strength of the bequest motive, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the decision to access the stock market are key determinants of the model's quantitative predictions. Financial wealth is a key endogenous state variable in the model, is directly a¤ected by these parameters and is therefore a key predictor variable in assessing the model's quantitative implications. Contrary to frictionless theoretical models, there exist reasonable preference parameter con…gurations that generate very low annuity market participation.
How Deep is the Puzzle?
In this section we evaluate the extent to which the model's predictions are at odds with the data. We employ a method of simulated moments estimator to pick the structural parameters that minimize the distance between some selected moments in the data and in the model. The main predictions that we focus on are the participation in the annuity market, and, conditional on participation, the amount of annuity demand at retirement. Consistent with the empirical evidence from the previous sections, we separate our analysis between stockholders and non-stockholders. In both estimated models we have two parameters to match two moments. Speci…cally, we set risk aversion equal to two and estimate the bequest parameter and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to match the voluntary annuity market participation rate and the average annuity demand conditional on participation. We set risk aversion to two consistent with the available empirical evidence (Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , for instance). In unreported estimations we also match the share of wealth annuitized conditional on participation by estimating the risk aversion coe¢ cient. Our risk aversion estimates were between 1:5 and 2:2 but we opted to set the risk aversion equal to two for both groups and only focus on the participation rate and the level of annuity demand conditional on participation. We do this because for most annuitants we impute …nancial wealth before an annuity purchase using an average annuity factor.
Non-Stockholders
Given the wealth distribution for non-stockholders at retirement as an exogenous input, Table   6 ; Panel A, reports the estimated structural parameters from this procedure. 36 The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated at around 0:09 and there is evidence for a bequest motive (1:52). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is consistent with studies based on intertemporal Euler equations (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). The predicted annuity market participation rate for this group of households is around 3:1% (versus 3:2% in the data).
Conditional on participation, the annual annuity purchased is around 1; 790 GBP (versus 1; 650 GBP in the data) and the share of wealth being annuitized is around 8:3% (versus 36:6% in the data, but with a standard deviation of 31:6%). We think that the intuition for these results is clear. The wealth distribution for non-stockholders is concentrated very much to the left of the wealth distribution and poor households optimally choose not to annuitize, or annuitize a small fraction of their wealth, since pension income already provides a reasonable insurance against longevity risk.
It could be argued that our results arise from certain exogenous assumptions in the model.
For instance, we use a load factor of 20% which might be considered very high. We therefore next investigate the robustness of our conclusions to such maintained assumptions. Table 7 , 
denotes the di¤erent moments chosen, variables Y; (Ỹ ) denote actual (simulated) data, T is the sample size and T H is the total size of simulated data. Following the rules of thumb in Michaelides and Ng (2000) we use H = 10. The derivatives are computed numerically and E is the population average (sample analog used in the estimation).
Panel A, reports the results from changing these parameters while maintaining everything else as in the estimated model. A lower pension (set at the 25th percentile) increases annuity market participation from 3:1% to 4:25%, whereas a higher pension (75th pension percentile) decreases participation to 1:15%. Nevertheless, the results with regards to the three moments of interest are still relatively close to their empirical counterparts, if one takes into account the standard deviation of these moments in the data. We next investigate the implications of a lower subjective survival probability (the household expects the survival probability to be 10% lower than the objective one). This expectation drives annuity demand to zero and the result is consistent with the multivariate probit analysis in Section 2. We also investigate what happens when an actuarially fair annuity policy exists. This change increases annuity participation from 3:1% to 6:75% and voluntary annuity demand from 1; 790 GBP to 6; 270
GBP. These results indicate that there is a range of possible outcomes that the model can generate depending on exogenous assumptions, but we view as robust the basic message that there exist preference parameters that can replicate the observed data as part of the posited structural model.
Stockholders
We follow the same estimation procedure for stockholders and report the results in Table   6 , Panel B. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is around 0:48 and the bequest parameter equals 0:2. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is again consistent in magnitude with the empirical evidence o¤ered in Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) , with wealthier households having a higher elasticity. The level of annuity market participation is around 7:8% (9:6% in the data), with 16% of …nancial wealth being annuitized at retirement (26% in the data), giving an annual annuity income of around 3; 820 GBP (3; 656 GBP in the data).
We view these predicted outcomes as quite close to their observed counterparts.
There is one caveat to the implications for stockholders. Our model is intentionally simple and abstracts from any background risks that older households might face (health risk, for instance). As a result, the portfolio held by the household is heavily invested in the stock market, since with the provision of reasonable pension income and a certain annuity income, the natural prediction of the model is that households would hold stocks to have a diversi…ed portfolio (since annuities and pension income act implicitly like bonds/riskless assets). In our preferred speci…cations, the share of wealth in stocks is around 95 98% and that typically decreases to around 50% in the presence of the strong bequest motive. We do think that this is a potentially counterfactual prediction but we also think that the introduction of further risks (like health expenditures) in the model (for which liquid balances will be needed) will work towards both reducing annuity demand and generating a more conservative portfolio, an interesting avenue for further research.
In Table 7 , Panel B, we o¤er some further comparative statics to illustrate that the data can be replicated by not only perturbing preference parameters. Higher and lower pension levels a¤ect the participation rate in the expected way and a lower subjective survival probability again reduces annuity market participation. Our conclusions, therefore, are robust to substantial changes in underlying parameters.
Conclusion
We provide an in depth empirical analysis of the characteristics of households that participate (or not) in the U.K. voluntary annuity market. We document that annuity demand increases in …nancial wealth, education and life expectancy, while it decreases in pension income and a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses. Moreover, we …nd that the annuitization behavior of stock market participants is better explained by a reduced form model than the behavior of non-participants. We then estimate a life-cycle model of household portfolio choice and annuity demand after retirement. The model emphasizes the role of access to stock market opportunities, bequests, risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (and through these …nancial wealth) as the main determinants of annuity demand. Comparing the predictions of the model with their empirical counterparts, we …nd that reasonable preference parameters can generate the low annuity demand observed in the data.
We emphasize that by assuming that all purchased annuities are of the nominal (…xed payout) type, we are assuming essentially an incomplete market. According to Davido¤, Brown and Diamond (2005) we should not expect full annuitization in an incomplete market.
These authors provide simulations which suggest that households will tend to annuitize more than two-thirds of their wealth in incomplete markets, while we observe much smaller percentages (26 percent on average for stockholders) in our data. We show that we can match the observed percentages by allowing households to invest in the stock market. Thus, our model provides strong arguments for variable (stock-market linked) annuities. While these annuity products exist in the U.K., they are rarely demanded. More than 70 percent of purchased annuities in the U.K. are of the nominal type (Stark, 2002) . Conditional on this exclusion of variable annuities, we can rationalize the observed annuitization rates and therefore conclude that the annuity market participation puzzle might not be as deep as previously thought. Total-% 94.1 5.9 100.0 Table 2: The table presents Notes to Table 3: The table presents Berndt et al. (1974) estimator of asymptotic standard errors. The marginal effects are calculated for a 65 years old single male without children, medium education, average subjective survival probability, average pension and average wealth. The asymptotic distribution of marginal effects is computed with the delta method.
The linear annuity demand model is estimated with OLS using White's (1980) income in thousands of pounds, conditional on participation, and the voluntary share of wealth annuitized is the optimal amount of purchased annuity at retirement as a percentage of total financial wealth at retirement. The annuity equivalent wealth reports average AEW, which is defined as the wealth each individual is willing to give up in order to be able to access the annuity market. Notes to Table 6 : Panel A (Panel B) reports estimated parameters for the non-stockholder (stockholder) model using a method of simulated moments to pick the structural parameters that minimize the distance between some selected moments in the data and in the model. The moments are the participation in the annuity market, and, conditional on participation, the amount of annuity demand at retirement. The last column reports a third (unmatched) moment: the share of wealth annuitized. Standard errors are computed using an optimal weighting matrix that is based on the inverse of the variance of the empirical moments. We constrain γ (risk aversion) to equal 2 for both groups. Notes to Table 7 : Panel A reports simulated results using the non-stockholder model, and Panel B the simulated results using stock market participants. The risk free rate is set to 2%, the equity premium at 4% and the standard deviation of risky asset return at 18%. Pre-existing pension income is set at each group's median value.
Comparative statics are performed over several parameter specifications. In particular, for the MSM parameters are set equal to estimated parameters reported in Table 6 , in Low and High Pension cases the corresponding 25th
and 75th percentiles of pre-existing pension are used for each group. Low survival is the case where individual's survival probabilities are reduced by 10% and Actuarial Fair is the case for annuities with zero load factor.
Voluntary annuity market participation reports average participation in percentage terms, Voluntary annuity demand is defined as average annual annuity income in thousands of pounds, conditional on participation, and the voluntary share of wealth annuitized is the optimal amount of purchased annuity at retirement as a percentage of total financial wealth at retirement. The Annuity equivalent wealth reports average AEW, which is defined as the wealth each individual is willing to give up in order to e able to access the annuity market. 
